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CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REGULATE SEX
DISCRIMINATION: THE EFFECT OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S "NEW FEDERALISM"
Calvin Massey*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congressional power to prevent and remedy sex discrimination in employ-
ment has been founded almost entirely upon the commerce kower and Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which gives Congress power "to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation" the equal protection guarantee. 1 The commerce power has en-
abled Congress to prohibit private sex discrimination in employment, and the com-
bination of the commerce and enforcement powers has enabled Congress to pro-
hibit such sex discrimination by public employers. From the late 1930s until the
early 1990s the doctrinal architecture of these powers was relatively stable, even if
statutory action to realize the promise of a nondiscriminatory workplace was de-
ferred until enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 2
Under that doctrinal scheme the Court reviewed legislation enacted pursuant to the
commerce power only to determine if Congress had made a rational determination
that an activity it sought to regulate was either in interstate commerce, an instru-
mentality of interstate commerce, or affected interstate commerce. 3 With respect
to the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement power, the combination of South
Carolina v. Katzenbach4 and Katzenbach v. Morgan5 established that Congress
could enact startlingly broad measures to remedy or prevent unconstitutional ac-
tions of the states. Indeed, the alternative holding of Morgan was that Congress
could redefine the scope of the guarantees afforded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.6 The result was extremely deferential review of federal legislation address-
ing issues of equal protection, including sex discrimination, whether founded on
the commerce or the enforcement power.
* Calvin Massey is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings. I thank my
research assistant, Lisa Core, Boston College Law School '03, for her excellent research assis-
tance, Boston College Law School for its intellectual support and inclusive community, Hastings
for its financial support, and the University of Maine School of Law for the opportunity to
present these thoughts. I also appreciate the thoughtful and incisive comments of Vikram Amar.
The combination of his powerful intellect and views that differ from mine was a great spur to
deeper thought on these matters.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
3. "[W]hen Congress has determined that an activity affects interstate commerce, the courts
need inquire only whether the finding is rational." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981). In Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), the
Court referred to congressional findings documenting the relationship of prohibited extortionate
local loans to interstate commerce, but promptly added, "We do so not to infer that Congress
need make particularized findings in order to legislate." Id. at 156.
4. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
5. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
6. Id. at 648-50. Morgan upheld Section 4 (e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §
1973b(e) (1994), which prohibited states from using English literacy as a voter eligibility re-
quirement with respect to voters educated through the sixth grade in Puerto Rico. The Act had
its principal impact upon New York, which imposed a general voter eligibility requirement of
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That scheme has been altered considerably by the Supreme Court's "New Fed-
eralism," a series of cases that have extended the scope of state sovereign immu-
nity and increased the level of scrutiny the courts will apply to federal legislation
enacted under the commerce or enforcement powers. The result is heightened
uncertainty about the ability of Congress to address perceived problems of sex
discrimination in the workplace, most particularly with respect to the ability of
Congress to provide a damages remedy for public employees when their govern-
ment employers violate the provisions of federal laws designed to ensure a sexu-
ally nondiscriminatory workplace. This Article first briefly describes the doctrinal
alterations worked by the Court's "New Federalism," then discusses its applica-
tion to the provisions of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)7 that are at issue
in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,8 perhaps the most important
federalism case on the Court's docket this coming Term, offers a few observations
about the implications of these developments and some thoughts on legislative
strategies for the future, and closes with a brief summary that places in perspective
the New Federalism and its significance to the problem of sex discrimination in
employment.
There are three essential pieces to the New Federalism, and two other doc-
trines that, while germane, are as yet peripheral to the problem upon which I focus
here-sex discrimination in the workplace. The essential pieces are the commerce
power, the enforcement power, and the ever more robust constitutional doctrine of
state sovereign immunity. The peripheral doctrines-but, I hasten to add, as yet
peripheral doctrines-are the state autonomy exception to the commerce power
and the spending power.
A. Commerce
When the Supreme Court, in 1995, struck down the Gun Free School Zones
Act of 1990, 9 it marked the first time in nearly sixty years that the Court had
invalidated an act of Congress regulating private behavior on the ground that Con-
gress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to enact the legislation. Whatever
the long run impact of United States v. LopezlO-be it earthquake or thunderclap-
Lopez and its progeny, particularly United States v. Morrison, 11 have increased the
English literacy. Even though the Court had previously ruled that English literacy requirements
for suffrage did not violate equal protection (without additional proof of invidiously discrimina-
tory intent in imposing such requirements), see Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360
U.S. 45, 50-52 (1959), the Court in Morgan concluded that the scope of the enforcement power
is coterminous with Congress's implementation power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650. Section 5, said the Court, "is a positive grant of legis-
lative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 651. That
power, however, said the Court, runs in only one direction: "We emphasize that Congress'
power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; §
5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees." Id. at 651 n.10.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
8. 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002) (granting cert. sub nom. to Hibbs v. Department of Human Re-
sources, 273 E3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001)).
9. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995) (striking down 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)).
10. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
11. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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level of judicial scrutiny applicable to legislation that regulates activities that are
claimed to affect interstate commerce but are neither activities in interstate com-
merce nor instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Such activities may be regu-
lated only if they have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 12 More spe-
cifically, Lopez required Congress, whenever it seeks to regulate an intrastate non-
commercial activity, to demonstrate that the regulated activity substantially affects
interstate commerce. In Morrison, the Court invalidated the civil remedy provi-
sion of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 13 despite elaborate congres-
sional findings of fact that sex-motivated violence affected interstate commerce
quite substantially. 14 Any doubt left after Lopez that the Court would defer to
congressional findings of fact concerning the effect of a regulated activity upon
interstate commerce was thus removed by Morrison. No longer will the Court
defer to congressional findings of fact on this point, but will examine de novo the
substantiality of the effect.
However, it is not clear that Morrison and Lopez actually warrant the Court to
apply de novo review universally. Because in Morrison the regulated activity-
"[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence"-was "not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity,"' 15 Morrison raised the possibility that the scope of the Court's
de novo review of "substantial effect" is limited to instances when Congress regu-
lates intrastate noncommercial activities.16 That, at least, is a reading of Morrison
that is consistent with its facts, and leads to the tentative conclusion that the Court
may, after Morrison, defer to congressional findings of fact when its regulation is
of intrastate commercial activities. To the extent that the Court will so defer to
Congress, Lopez and Morrison may not herald much change in congressional abil-
ity to prohibit sex discrimination by private or public employers, because such
activity is surely a commercial activity, whether or not the activity is intrastate.
But if the Court's de novo review is now globally applicable to any exercise of
the commerce power over activities that substantially affect interstate commerce
but which are neither in interstate commerce nor constitute an instrumentality of
interstate commerce, the Court will presumably ignore documented congressional
findings of the substantial effect on interstate commerce exerted by the regulated
activity. Suppose, to take a somewhat trivial yet symbolic example, that Congress
prohibited employers from discriminating by sex, either intentionally or in effect,
in demanding office secretaries to make and fetch coffee for their supervisors. It
might be difficult for Congress or lawyers to convince the Court, on de novo re-
view, of the substantial effect on interstate commerce of sexual discrimination in
office coffee preparation and service by secretaries. This latter view, however,
seems unsupported by the actual holdings in Lopez and Morrison.
In short, it is probable that Morrison and Lopez only authorize de novo review
when Congress regulates an intrastate, noncommercial activity, and thus have little
impact on congressional power to regulate workplace sex discrimination.
That conclusion, however, is subject to some important reservations with re-
spect to public employers, which may in the end be more important than the initial
12. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
14. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613-14.
15. Id. at 613.
16. See generally id. at 607-10.
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conclusion. To grasp the reservations, we must examine the other two essential
pieces of the New Federalism: state sovereign immunity and the enforcement
power. The two are very much related.
B. State Sovereign Immunity
The Constitution that emerged from Independence Hall in September of 1787
does not mention state sovereign immunity. Thus, when in Chisholm v. Georgia17
the Court confronted the question of whether states could be sued in federal court
for damages, it examined the sources of federal jurisdiction in Article III and found
no jurisdictional exception favoring states. 18 That decision, it has been asserted,
worked such a "shock of surprise" 19 that it was speedily overturned by the Elev-
enth Amendment. 20 A century later, after the advent of general federal question
jurisdiction in the federal courts, the Supreme Court read the rather specific party-
based jurisdictional language of the Eleventh Amendment as a placeholder for a
general principle of state sovereign immunity. As a later Court put it, "Behind the
words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. '2 1
As is well known, the current shape of those postulates is expanding. Via the
officer-suit fiction of Ex Parte Young, 22 states remain subject to injunctions bar-
ring them from prospective violation of constitutional rights and federal statutory
rights, but whether in suits against state officials or the state itself, damages may
not be obtained2 3 from the state treasury unless the state has either consented to
the suit or Congress has validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.24 However,
since Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,2 5 Congress may abrogate state sover-
eign immunity only by use of its enforcement power. 26 Moreover, state sovereign
immunity is not merely limited to suits in federal court. Alden v. Maine27 held that
Congress lacks authority to compel states to entertain in their own courts private
damages suits against the state based on federal law, reasoning that the principle of
state immunity from suit without its consent was a pre-constitutional attribute of
sovereignty that was not waived by the states in the Constitution, either explicitly
or by any implication from the grant to the federal government of its enumerated
powers. 28 The Alden rationale was applied this past Term, in Federal Maritime
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,29 in which the Court ex-
tended state sovereign immunity to bar federal administrative agencies from adju-
dicating a private party's complaint against a nonconsenting state. 30 There are
several implications that flow from these events, but for the moment let us focus
17. 2 U.S. (2 Dalil.) 419 (1793).
18. Id.
19. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
21. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
22. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
23. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1974).
24. Id. at 672.
25. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
26. Id. at 61.
27. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
28. ld. at 754.
29. 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002).
30. Id. at 1878-79.
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on the interaction of state sovereign immunity and the Fourteenth Amendment's
enforcement power. Most significantly, to the extent that federal law imposes
damages liability upon state governments for unlawful sex discrimination, the ef-
ficacy of that remedy is entirely dependent on establishing that the federal law is
an appropriate exercise of the enforcement power. Thus, because the enforcement
power is the only power available to Congress by which it may abrogate state
sovereign immunity, the scope of the enforcement power becomes exceedingly
important.
C. Enforcement Power
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment vests Congress with power to enforce
the substantive guarantees of the Amendment by "appropriate legislation. '3 1 The
broadest statement of the scope of that power was the Court's position, taken in
Morgan, that Section 5 "is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Con-
gress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed
to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."'32 That discretion, how-
ever, has been sharply bounded by City ofBoerne v. Flores.33 In Flores, the Court
ruled that the enforcement power is confined to "measures that remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions,"'34 and fashioned the "congruence and proportionality"
test to evaluate whether any given exercise of the power was such a measure.
Although "Congress must have wide latitude[,] ... [t]here must be a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end."'35 But what does "congruence and proportionality" mean?
According to the Court in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett,36
[t]he first step in applying these... principles is to identify with some precision
the scope of the constitutional right at issue .... Once we have determined the
metes and bounds of the constitutional right in question, we examine whether
Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional [behavior] by the
States .... 37
That suggests that the enforcement power is limited to little more than legislation
that prohibits conduct that is already unconstitutional, or very close to it. But in
Flores the Court described the enforcement power as both preventive and remedial
of unconstitutional wrongs, and acknowledged that the "appropriateness of reme-
dial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures
appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser
one."'3 8 In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,39 even as it ruled that Congress
could not use its enforcement power to prohibit all age discrimination in employ-
ment by states, the Court noted that "[d]ifficult and intractable problems [of un-
constitutional behavior by states] often require powerful remedies, [including] rea-
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
32. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
33. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
34. Id. at 519.
35. Id. at 520.
36. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
37. Id. at 365, 368.
38. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 530 (citation omitted).
39. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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sonably prophylactic legislation."'40 Thus, surely Congress may do more than sim-
ply outlaw what the Constitution already forbids. Just as surely Congress may not"substantively redefine the States' legal obligations" under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.4 1 The amorphous twins, congruence and proportionality, purport to chart
this boundary.
Linguistically, congruence and proportionality describe different qualities.
Congruence means "agree[ing]; correspond[ing]; harmon[ious]; ' 4 2 in geometry,"congruent" describes two figures which, "if placed one upon another, coincide
exactly in all their parts."'43 Proportional, on the other hand, describes a relative
relationship; in mathematics it means a constant ratio.44 Transposed to the legal
idiom, congruence could describe either or both of two qualities: an enforcement
power exactly identical to (or at least harmonious with) the constitutional guaran-
tee, or a legislative remedy that is exactly identical to (or at least harmonious with)
the problem. Legislation that does no more than prohibit conduct that is already
prohibited by the Constitution is not problematic; such legislation is congruent
under the former definition and is surely proportional. But such legislation is rare;
when Congress invokes its enforcement power it is usually in the business of pro-
hibiting more conduct than the Constitution prohibits, in order to create a sort of
buffer zone around constitutional rights, as a way of ensuring the vindication of
those rights. When Congress so acts the issues of congruence, latterly defined, and
of proportionality become critical to resolution of the question of whether Con-
gress has validly exercised its enforcement power.
While proportionality would appear to admit an enforcement power broader
than the constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, but in a fixed and
constant ratio to those guarantees, the Court's notion of proportionality seems nar-
rower. If proportionality means a constant ratio between constitutional violation
and legislative remedy, the Court's idea of the outer limits of that ratio is little
more than 1:1. Of course, that sense of proportionality makes the concept no dif-
ferent from congruence, defined as an enforcement power exactly identical to the
constitutional guarantee. Such an understanding of proportionality effectively ren-
ders moot the alternative meaning of congruence-a legislative remedy identical
to or harmonious with the problem located by Congress-because it will not mat-
ter how carefully Congress shapes its remedy to fit the identified problem if the
scope of the problem that Congress may address by its enforcement power may
not be any broader than the underlying constitutional guarantee.
Perhaps it is best to assess the Court's understanding of congruence and pro-
portionality by illustration from the Court's decisions. In Flores, the Court ruled
that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 45 was beyond the enforce-
ment power because it was a legislative attempt to redefine the meaning of the free
exercise clause and there was no proof in the legislative history that states were
trampling upon the citizenry's right freely to exercise religious faith or practice.46
The remedy, thought the Court, went well beyond any identified problem and also
far beyond the constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion, secured through
40. Id. at 88.
41. Id.
42. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 309 (College ed., 1968).
43. Id. at 309-10.
44. Id. at 1168.
45. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
46. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-32, 536 (1997).
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the Due Process Clause. 47 RFRA's failing was either a lack of congruence, de-
fined as a remedy that precisely fits an identified problem, or a lack of proportion-
ality, defined as a ratio precisely or nearly equal to the constitutional guarantee, in
which latter case proportionality was doing the same work as congruence, when
congruence is defined as a remedy identical to the constitutional guarantee.
Flores, of course, merely introduced congruence and proportionality into the
constitutional lexicon and, in doing so, left many questions unanswered. Fore-
most among these is the method of determining whether a constitutional problem
even exists. At first glance, one might think that an actual constitutional violation
is unnecessary to support exercise of the enforcement power-a reasonable possi-
bility of a constitutional violation might be enough.4 8 Although the Court in Flores
acknowledged that the enforcement power could extend to prevention, it also faulted
RFRA because it was not a response to a documented history of "widespread and
persisting deprivation of constitutional rights." 49 To appreciate the significance of
this suggestion, it is helpful to conceive of proportionality as a fraction, the nu-
merator of which is the congressionally selected remedy and the denominator of
which is the constitutional problem. The Flores suggestion implies that the de-
nominator can never be zero, and might be insufficient to support the enforcement
power unless it is significantly greater than zero, a position, which if true, belies
the concession that the enforcement power extends to prevention of constitutional
violations before they occur. Later cases seemingly confirm this reading.
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Sav-
ings Bank50 the Court concluded that the Patent Remedy Act,5 1 which amended
the patent laws expressly to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, was not within
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
because there was no proof in the legislative record that states were denying patent
holders due process by infringing on their patents and denying them a remedy in
the state court system.5 2 Here, the apparent flaw was that the remedy went well
beyond the contours of an identified problem. The Court, however, was madden-
ingly equivocal on the question of whether the flaw was the complete absence of
identified constitutional violations or merely an insufficient number of violations:
Congress appears to have enacted this legislation in response to a handful of
instances of state patent infringement that do not necessarily violate the Consti-
tution. Though the lack of support in the legislative record is not determinative,
identifying the targeted constitutional wrong or evil is still a critical part of our §
5 calculus because "[s]trong measures appropriate to address one harm may be
an unwarranted response to another, lesser one." Here, the record at best offers
scant support for Congress' conclusion that States were depriving patent owners
of property without due process of law by pleading sovereign immunity in fed-
eral-court patent actions. 53
If there were any instances of such constitutional wrongs, the Patent Remedy Act
would seemingly have been perfectly proportional to the wrong, inasmuch as it
47. Id. at 536.
48. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
49. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 526.
50. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
51. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
52. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 643-45.
53. Id. at 645-46 (quoting City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 530) (internal citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added).
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merely provided an individual damage remedy to specific victims of constitutional
wrongdoing, rather than prohibiting a whole host of activities that may be consti-
tutionally valid. The Court's concession that the legislative record offered "scant"
evidence of constitutional violations suggests that there was some such evidence,
but the pattern of wrongdoing identified by Congress was not sufficiently wide-
spread and persistent to support even a narrowly tailored remedy.
In United States v. Morrison,54 the civil remedy provisions of VAWA were
invalidated even though there was an adequate demonstration in the legislative
record that states were systematically depriving the victims of sex-motivated vio-
lence of a remedy in their own judicial systems.55 The failings in Morrison were
twofold. First, the legislation was directed at individuals (the perpetrators of sex-
motivated violence) by subjecting those individuals to civil liability, rather than
prohibiting official misconduct, as required by the state action doctrine. Second,
the legislation was uniformly applicable even though the problem was not uni-
form; Congress had identified a constitutional problem only in some states. The
Court noted that prior exercises of the enforcement power, such as in Katzenbach
v. Morgan56 or South Carolina v. Katzenbach,57 had involved legislation targeted
at and effective in only the offending states. This latter point reinforced either or
both of two conclusions: the constitutional evil addressed by Congress must be
widespread and persistent in order to invoke the enforcement power at all; or an
additional measure of proportionality is a remedy that is precisely tailored to the
geographic scope of the identified problem.
In Kimel v. Florida Board ofRegents,58 the Court voided the provisions of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 59 that prohibited the states from
age discrimination in employment because the prohibition was much broader than
the constitutional infirmity addressed.60 The Act prohibited the states from ratio-
nal age discrimination in employment, and rational age discrimination is, of course,
constitutionally permissible. The remedy failed the proportionality test because it
prohibited "substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would
likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis
standard." '6 1 But the ADEA provisions at issue in Kimel may also have failed the
Court's version of congruence as well, because "Congress failed to identify [in the
legislative record] a widespread pattern of age discrimination by the States."'62
Finally, in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett6 3 the
Court struck down the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 64
54. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
55. Id. at 619-20."[A]n assertion that there is pervasive bias in various state justice systems
against victims of gender-motivated violence.... is supported by a voluminous congressional
record." Id.
56. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
57. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
58. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. III 1999). 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) makes it unlawful
for an employer, including public employers such as states, "to fail or refusz to hire or to dis-
charge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual ... because of such
individual's age."
60. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. at 82.
61. Id. at 86.
62. Id. at 90-91.
63. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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that subjected states to damages suits for violation of the Act's prohibition of em-
ployment discrimination against people with covered disabilities, reasoning that
Congress had failed to document a pattern of irrational discrimination against dis-
abled people by states and that the breadth of the prohibition, extending well be-
yond irrational discrimination against the disabled, indicated that Congress was
essentially rewriting the Equal Protection Clause. 65 Congress's enforcement power,
said the Court, may be "appropriately exercised only in response to state transgres-
sions" and then only if Congress has identified in the legislative history "a history
and pattern of unconstitutional" state behavior that Congress seeks to remedy or
prevent prospectively. 66 The flaw in the ADA provisions at issue in Garrett was
that "[t]he legislative record of the ADA... fails to show that Congress did in fact
identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the dis-
abled." 67
H. HIBBS AND THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
The FMLA, which applies to public employers such as states, 68 provides, in
part, that eligible employees may take unpaid leave totaling twelve weeks per cal-
endar year "[iun order to care for the spouse, [child], or parent, of the employee, if
such spouse, [child], or parent has a serious health condition."'69 Other portions of
the FMLA require employers, including public employers, to provide twelve weeks
of annual unpaid leave "[b]ecause of the birth of a [child] and in order to care for
such [child]," '7 0 because of the acquisition of an adoptive or foster child,7 1 and
"[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to per-
form the functions of the position of such employee. '72
Each of these provisions raise different issues concerning congressional au-
thority to use its enforcement power to abrogate state sovereign immunity and
subject state employers to private damages suits for violation of the FMLA. The
first three provisions, governing leave for the birth or care of one's child, the ar-
rival of an adoptive or foster child, and to care for an ill family member, are all
premised on congressional findings that, prior to the FMLA, employers discrimi-
nated by sex in granting of such leave by granting leave to women far more often
than to men.7 3 The last provision, providing for personal leave for illness, has a
much less credible grounding in sex discrimination and, accordingly, will be con-
sidered first.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000).
65. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
66. Id. at 368.
67. Id.
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (2000), which authorizes suits by employees "against any
employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction."
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(iii) (2000) defines "public agency" by incorporating the definition of"public agency" contained in 29 U.S.C. § 203(x), which includes within that definition "the
government of a State or political subdivision thereof" and "any agency of... a State, or a
political subdivision of a State." Identical statutory language in the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000), was interpreted by the Court in Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents to
mean that Congress had thereby clearly intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. at 73-74.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2000).
70. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(A).
71. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(B).
72. Id. 9 2612(a)(1)(D).
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Although a number of litigants have made the argument that the personal
medical leave provision of the FMLA is a prophylactic measure to combat sex
discrimination, the argument has been a universal failure in the federal courts of
appeals. Seven circuits-the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Elev-
enth-have concluded that the personal medical leave provision of the FMLA was
not validly enacted under the enforcement power.74 In so doing, they have re-
jected the argument that the personal medical leave provision is but an undifferen-
tiated part of a general prohibition upon sex discrimination in employment leave.
As the First Circuit put it in Laro v. New Hampshire,7 5 the provision "must be
linked... not just to such gender-based problems in society at large, but specifi-
cally to unconstitutional gender discrimination by states in their capacity as em-
ployers."'76 The rationale that the FMLA serves to counteract sex stereotyping in
family roles has bite with respect to the parental and family leave provisions but
not with respect to the personal medical leave provision. No more efficacious is
the rationale that the personal medical leave provision serves to remedy sex dis-
crimination in granting leave that responds to the temporary disabilities resulting
from pregnancy. First, such disabilities are addressed by the parental leave provi-
sions. Second, the existence of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,7 7 which for-
bids employers from discriminating on the basis of pregnancy and requires em-
ployers offering benefit programs (including leave) to include pregnancy within
such programs, substantially obviates the claim that the personal medical leave
provision is really a prophylactic device to combat pregnancy discrimination in
leaves. Third, to the extent that the personal medical leave provision is so grounded,
the Supreme Court has held that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not, at
least when cost-justified, a violation of equal protection.7 8 Finally, the legislative
history reveals that the personal medical leave provision was motivated primarily
by the desire "to protect families from the economic dislocation caused by a fam-
ily member losing his or her job due to a serious medical problem,"'7 9 and second-
arily by "a concern to protect workers who were temporarily disabled by serious
health problems from discrimination on account of their medical condition." 80 Of
course, as the First Circuit noted, Garrett has "disposed of [the] disability ratio-
nale as sufficient basis to overcome Eleventh Amendment immunity ' 8 1 and, thus,
73. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (2000), which states the primary purpose of the FMLA
to be "minimiz[ing] the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring
generally that leave is available for ... compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral basis."
Various testimony before Congress during the evolution of the FMLA also indicate congres-
sional concern for sex-discriminatory leave policies. See, e.g., Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d
519, 525-26 nn.23 & 24 (5th Cir. 2000).
74. Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2001); Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61, 68-69
(2d Cir. 2000); Chittister v. Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2000);
Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d at 529; Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559, 566 (6th Cir.
2000); Townsel v. Missouri, 233 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000); Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at
Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'don other grounds, 531 U.S.
356 (2001).
75. 259 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001).
76. Id. at 12.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
78. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495-97 (1974).
79. Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d at 12 (citing Senate and House reports).
80. Id. (citing Senate and House reports).
81. Id. at 13.
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there is little reason to think that the protection of families from economic disloca-
tion produced by serious illness is sufficiently connected to the constitutional guar-
antees that Congress is empowered to enforce. In the Court's jargon, such an
exercise, even if congruent (in the sense of fitting the problem precisely) would
surely be disproportionate. And that is the universal judgment of the federal courts
of appeals that have considered the personal medical leave provisions as applied to
state employers.
However, the parental and family leave provisions stand on a different foot-
ing. The circuits have split on the validity of the family leave provision as applied
to state employers for the purpose of abrogating state sovereign immunity and
subjecting states to damages suits in federal court. In Kazmier v. Widmann,82 the
Fifth Circuit held that Congress lacked authority to enact the provision under its
enforcement power 83; in Hibbs v. Department of Human Resources,84 the Ninth
Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, declaring Kazmier's analysis to be"unpersuasive. 85
When Congress enacted the FMLA it declared its principal purpose to be to"minimize[] the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex by
ensuring generally that leave is available for ... compelling family reasons, on a
gender-neutral basis." 86 To that end, the FMLA established a sex-blind minimum
standard of leave for family caretaking purposes. More precisely, the family leave
provision of the FMLA responds to sex discrimination in employment by banning
the allegedly common practice of employers granting such leave to women but not
men. This discrimination-founded on stereotypical notions of sex roles-hurts
men by not providing them equal opportunity to care for their families and hurts
women by effectively forcing them into the caretaking role and thus making them
less attractive as employees. When such discrimination is practiced by public
employers the Equal Protection Clause is implicated. None of this, however, an-
swers with certainty the question of whether the family leave provision of the
FMLA is sufficiently congruent and proportional to constitute a valid exercise of
the enforcement power.
In concluding that the family leave provision (at least as applied to the states
to abrogate state sovereign immunity) was an invalid exercise of the enforcement
power, the Fifth Circuit in Kazmier relied on two key factors. First, the family
leave provision was "broad, prophylactic legislation ... purporting to prohibit the
States from engaging in a broad swath of conduct that is not per se violative of the
Equal Protection Clause."'87 The court noted that "[tihere is nothing in the Consti-
tution that even closely approximates either a duty to give all employees up to
twelve weeks of leave per year to care for ailing family members or a right of an
employee to take such leave."' 88 The second factor was related to the first.
Broad, prophylactic legislation must be congruent with and proportional to ac-
tual, identified constitutional violations by the States. Yet in enacting the FMLA,
82. 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000).
83. Id. at 529.
84. 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002).
85. Id. at 858.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (2000).
87. Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d at 526.
88. Id.
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Congress identified no [such] pattern of discrimination by the States.... Con-
gress did make findings of such discrimination in the private sector, but such
evidence is not imputable to the public sector to validate abrogation. 89
The Kazmier court relied on Kimel for the proposition that Congress must make
specific findings of unconstitutional state conduct in order to enact broad legisla-
tion designed to prevent that conduct. 90
In concluding that the family leave provision was a valid exercise of the en-
forcement power, and thus abrogated state sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit
in Hibbs took a very different approach. First, it read Garrett, Kimel, and Florida
Prepaid to hold that "[e]xamination of legislative history is merely one means by
which a court can determine whether the broad prophylactic legislation under con-
sideration is justified by the existence of sufficiently difficult and intractable prob-
lems." 9 1 According to the Ninth Circuit, the absence of congressional findings of
specific state unconstitutional conduct in connection with employment leave was
not of great consequence to resolution of the larger issue of whether the family
leave provision "'can appropriately be characterized as legitimate remedial legis-
lation.' ' '92 Second, the court in Hibbs noted that sex discrimination by states is
presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only by overcoming the bur-
den of proving that such discrimination is substantially related to the achievement
of an actual compelling state interest. By contrast, the age and disability discrimi-
nation addressed by Congress in the ADEA and ADA that was held by the Court to
be outside the enforcement power in Kimel and Garrett was presumptively valid
and unconstitutional only upon proof that such discrimination was not rationally
related to a legitimate state objective. Thus, the Ninth Circuit thought that "[b]ecause
state-sponsored gender discrimination is presumptively unconstitutional, section 5
legislation that is intended to remedy or prevent gender discrimination is presump-
tively constitutional. '9 3 The importance of this conclusion is that "the burden is
on the challenger of [section 5] legislation [addressing sex discrimination by states]
to prove that states have not engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional conduct."'94
Because Nevada was unable "to show that there is not a widespread pattern of
gender discrimination by states regarding the granting of leave to employees to
care for sick family members or a historical record of state enforcement of stereo-
typical family roles"'95 the court concluded that the family leave provision was
validly enacted pursuant to the enforcement power.
There is an immediate problem with the majority's analysis in Hibbs: it is not
obvious why an exercise of the enforcement power that is purportedly directed at
presumptively unconstitutional behavior should be presumed to be valid. Whether
or not congruence and proportionality are workable and desirable parameters, it
would seem that at least some plausible connection between the legislative remedy
89. Id. (emphasis added) (second and third emphasis omitted).
90. Id. The Court in Kimel stated that the "argument that Congress found substantial age
discrimination in the private sector... is beside the point. Congress made no such findings with
respect to the States." Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90 (2000) (citation omitted).
91. Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d at 857.
92. Id. (quoting Kilcullen v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 2000),
overruled on other grounds, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 857-58.
95. Id. at 858.
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and the purported violation must be present in order for the legislation to be "ap-
propriate" enforcement. An example may clarify the point. Race-based classifica-
tions are presumptively unconstitutional. Suppose Congress bars the states from
using race at all in admissions to public universities. Under the majority view in
Hibbs, this bar would be a presumptively valid exercise of the enforcement power
and would be void only if the challenger could prove a complete absence of any
pattern of unconstitutional use of race in admission to public universities. Of course,
this burden would be insuperable as to any state of the old Confederacy, and prob-
ably most others as well, but it is not at all clear that any use of race as a factor in
admission to public universities is unconstitutional.
A different approach was taken by Judge Berzon in a portion of the opinion
that was originally a concurrence, but adopted by the majority in Hibbs as an alter-
native holding. Judge Berzon argued that in the family care leave provisions of the
FMLA "Congress was acting against a background of state-imposed systemic bar-
riers to women's equality in the workplace that, under recent constitutional doc-
trine, were undoubtedly unconstitutional."'96 To protect women from perceived
ills, states enacted a long train of sex-specific laws that specified women's wages
and limited women's working hours, working conditions, or even occupations,
and these laws were justified and usually upheld on the basis of stereotyped no-
tions of sex roles.9 7 In enacting the family care leave provision of the FMLA,
Congress was seeking to dismantle several sexual stereotypes rooted in past state
laws: (1) that men do not need such leave because there exist some women in their
lives who will assume family care responsibility; (2) that women need such leave
because they are the family care-givers; (3) that women are risky employees be-
cause they may need to seek such leave; and (4) that people-men and women-
will never apportion family care responsibilities among themselves as they alone
see fit. The family care leave provision, asserted Judge Berzon, was congruent
and proportional because it was "reasonably prophylactic legislation [addressed to
a] difficult and intractable" problem, 9 8 and when "judged with reference to the
historical experience it reflects," 9 9 was a narrowly tailored response to the "in-
teraction between workplace and domestic duties at the core of the unconstitu-
tional state legislation [that] sought to police a gender-specific division of labor,
separating the domestic, female sphere from the workplace, male realm." 100 Proof
of this narrow tailoring, said Judge Berzon, was to be found in the fact that the
provision "protects job security, not wage continuation,"'10 1 and thus is not about
economic benefits but is about "assuring the ability of women to participate in the
workforce despite their still-greater role in caring for ill relatives, and of men to
take on domestic responsibilities without foregoing their employment." 102
Sometime in the October 2002 Term of the Court we shall know whether the
Hibbs or Kazmier analysis will prevail. I do not propose to predict the outcome,
for as my Berkeley colleague Jesse Choper has quipped, "He who lives by the
crystal ball must be prepared to eat ground glass." I will, however, offer some
thoughts on the analytical process that is about to unfold in the coming Term.
96. Id. at 860.
97. Id. at 861-64.
98. Id. at 869 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000)).
99. Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 525 (1997)).
100. Id. at 870.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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A. The Relevance of Specific Congressional Findings
If the Court is intent on using congruence and proportionality as devices to tie
the enforcement power very closely to the underlying constitutional guarantees, it
is quite possible that the Court will insist upon a legislative record that identifies
specific unconstitutional conduct by the states that Congress seeks to remedy or
prevent. Indeed, in Garrett the Court laid out the analytical framework for en-
forcement power cases by noting that "[o]nce we have determined the metes and
bounds of the constitutional right in question, we examine whether Congress iden-
tified a history and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the
States against the disabled." 103 Of course, the "metes and bounds" of the constitu-
tional right at issue in Garrett-disability discrimination-was far narrower than
that at issue in Hibbs-sex discrimination-but there is no indication in Garrett
that the Court's insistence on a legislative record that identifies a "history and
pattern" of unconstitutional conduct by the states is limited merely to cases where
the metes and bounds of the constitutional right is described by minimal judicial
scrutiny under the rational-basis test. Indeed, the fact that the Court in Garrett
took pains to contrast the legislative record supporting the applicability of the ADA
to the states with that supporting the Voting Rights Act of 1965 suggests that the
requirement of specific findings of state wrongdoing documented in the legislative
record applies even when the constitutional right at issue is described by strict
scrutiny. 104 The Court in Garrett noted that when Congress enacted the Voting
Rights Act it
documented a marked pattern of unconstitutional action by the States. State offi-
cials, Congress found, routinely applied voting tests in order to exclude African-
American citizens from registering to vote[,] determined that litigation had proved
ineffective[,] and that there persisted an otherwise inexplicable 50-percentage-
point gap in the registration of white and African-American voters in some
States. 105
Perhaps Congress is not required to identify specific unconstitutional practices by
states, but if so, what purpose was to be served by pointing out the contrast be-
tween the legislative record underlying the Voting Rights Act and that underlying
the ADA?
To be sure, some commentators make the argument that a judicially imposed
requirement that Congress make specific findings of fact in order to invoke its
enforcement power "raises substantial separation-of-powers questions," 106 con-
cerns embraced by the Ninth Circuit in Hibbs as a factor in leading it to reject the
notion that Congress make such specific findings. 107 The essence of the objection
is that a requirement of specific findings amounts to an impermissible judicial
supervision of Congress's deliberative process. 10 8 That concern, however, is prob-
103. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
104. This also casts considerable doubt, as a predictive matter, on the tenability of Judge
Tashima's view, expressed in Hibbs, that presumptive validity should attach to any exercise of
the enforcement power to address presumptively unconstitutional practices.
105. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373.
106. A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme
Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
328, 331 (2001).
107. Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d at 856-57.
108. See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 106, at 376-83.
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ably misplaced. Congress may deliberate and act however it wants when it wields
its enforcement power, but the scope of that power is surely within the power of
the Court to review, and a fundamental issue of judicial review is, and always has
been, the degree of deference the courts will give to Congress. By insisting upon"on-the-record" documentation of the unconstitutional behavior Congress is au-
thorized to remedy, the Court is expressing the view that it will defer to Congress's
judgment that more conduct than the Constitution forbids must be prohibited in
order to vindicate constitutional guarantees only when Congress has clearly estab-
lished the predicate of constitutional wrongdoing. The Court has not stated that in
the absence of such on-the-record findings the enforcement power may not validly
be exercised; it has indicated that in the absence of such findings the significant
burden of proving sufficient congruence and proportionality to invoke the enforce-
ment power validly is upon the proponents of the legislation. In effect, the Court is
saying that if there is such a history and pattern of unconstitutional behavior, Con-
gress will document it, as it did with respect to the Voting Rights Act, and if there
is no such documentation, the burden is on the proponents of the law to prove
clearly and specifically-not by inference from the conduct of private actors-
that there is such a history and pattern. That is a far cry from judicial intervention
into the legislative process to determine whether a quorum is present, 109 or whether
a congressional hearing was proper and authorized, 110 or whether a congressional
committee was properly seeking information, r1 or whether the journals of pro-
ceedings kept by each house of Congress are the conclusive record of congres-
sional action. 112 Only the last case, Field v. Clark,113 is remotely similar and, in
it, the Court held only that Congress need not document in its journals that the
.same text of a bill was passed by each house, but was careful to note that a bill
would not become law if the bill "had not in fact been passed by Congress" even
though signed by the presiding officers of the House and the Senate, and the Presi-
dent. 114 Judicial review of whether a bill was in fact passed by Congress is far
more intrusive into the legislative process than insisting upon documented facts as
a predicate for judicial deference to congressional judgment, but the Court in Field
took pains to preserve precisely such review. The Speech and Debate Clause cases
provide no more support. In Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,115 for
example, even as the Court held that the judiciary could not impede Congress in its
gathering of information it concluded that the courts could inquire into whether
the congressional activity was a "legitimate legislative activity. ' ' 116 Review of
109. See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1892) (holding that determination of a quo-rum was consigned to each house for resolution, so long as the method was "reasonable"), dis-
cussed in Bryant & Simeone, supra note 106, at 377-78.
110. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1972) (holding that the Speech andDebate Clause prevented judicial review of the propriety of a Senate subcommittee meeting),
discussed in Bryant & Simeone, supra note 106, at 379-80.
111. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 506 (1975) (holding
that the Speech and Debate Clause barred judicial review of the propriety of a Senate subcom-
mittee subpoena, except for determination of whether the subpoena was a "legitimate legislative
activity"), discussed in Bryant & Simeone, supra note 106, at 380-81.
112. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892) (holding that the content of such journals,
except for matters specified by the Constitution, is within the discretion of each house of Con-
gress), discussed in Bryant & Simeone, supra note 106, at 376-77.
113. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
114. Id. at 669.
115. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
116. Id. at 501.
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any given nominal exercise of legislative power for legitimacy is more intrusive
upon legislative process than is determining whether Congress "appropriately"
exercised its enforcement power by examining the record upon which Congress
acted.
B. The "Metes and Bounds" of the Constitutional Guarantee Enforced
The Court said that its inquiry into the scope of the enforcement power begins
with a description of the "metes and bounds" of the constitutional guarantee that
Congress seeks to enforce. Because constitutional guarantees are negative-they
consist, by and large, of practices that are presumptively or per se forbidden to
governments-the only way to delineate those metes and bounds is to describe
what governments may not do. The Ninth Circuit, in Hibbs, said that when stat-
utes describe practices-here, sex discrimination-that are presumptively un-
constitutional, legislation directed at those practices should be presumptively valid
under the enforcement power. Although a presumption of validity may be unten-
able, 117 even if the burden of proving the invalidity of such exercises of the en-
forcement power should fall on the challenger to the legislation, there is no cer-
tainty that the burden is unlikely to be discharged. The Ninth Circuit thought that
this burden meant that the challenger must prove the absence of a history and
pattern of sex discrimination by public employers in granting leave for family
care, but that may not be the only way that burden can be discharged. If congru-
ence and proportionality mean in fact that the enforcement power is broader than
the constitutional guarantee only when Congress has factually demonstrated a his-
tory and pattern of unconstitutional behavior, it is still possible that the Court will
find that, despite such a factual demonstration, the remedy prescribed by Congress
is so much broader than the unconstitutional conduct it is supposed to remedy that
it is disproportionate, and thus beyond the enforcement power. Thus, even if the
Court were to adopt the Ninth Circuit's burden-shifting rule, a challenger might
succeed by establishing the disproportionality of the remedy rather than the ab-
sence of a history and pattern of unconstitutional conduct.
For example, suppose the Supreme Court applies the Ninth Circuit's approach
and concludes that the legislative record underlying the family leave provision of
the FMLA documents a sufficient history and pattern of unconstitutional sex dis-
crimination by states in granting leave to state employees for family care purposes.
This would not necessarily end the enforcement power inquiry; the Court might
still conclude that a sex-neutral requirement that all workers be given up to twelve
weeks leave per year for family care is disproportionate to the documented uncon-
stitutional conduct. What, after all, is the relationship between any given number
of weeks of leave and sex discrimination in granting such leave? A requirement
that family care leave be sex-neutral is surely integral to curing the documented
constitutional violation, but what is the connection between a prescribed amount
of leave and sex discrimination in granting leave? It is not wholly outlandish to
suppose that the Court might find the requirement of twelve weeks of leave dispro-
portionate to a documented finding of sex discrimination by state employers in
granting family care leave. That possibility suggests a final line of inquiry, one
that is almost entirely normative.
117. See Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) and text following
note 95.
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C. The Enforcement Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause
Although the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress power to enforce the
substance of the amendment by "appropriate legislation" 18 and the final clause of
Article I, Section 8 gives Congress authority to implement federal powers by mak-
ing "all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the
federal powers, 119 there can be no doubt that the Court applies a more stringent
test to the enforcement power than it does to the scope of the implementing power. 120
Each of the provisions struck down in Flores, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Morrison,
and Garrett was a rational method of vindicating rights secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment, but each was voided nonetheless. Moreover, it is hardly likely that
the Court would coin a new linguistic formulation-"congruence and proportion-
ality"-to describe what is already familiar-"rational means" or "rationally re-
lated."
Perhaps because the evidence is convincing that congruence and proportion-
ality is a form of heightened scrutiny, some commentators and judges argue that
the scope of the enforcement power should be coterminous with the implementing
power of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 121 The argument rests on one or more
of three assertions. The historical assertion is that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to give Congress an enforcement power identical to its imple-
mentation power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. The semantic assertion
is that the linguistic similarities between the enforcement and implementing pow-
ers argues for a parallel interpretation. The precedential assertion is that, prior to
Flores, the enforcement power was understood to be identical to the implementing
power and that neither Flores nor its progeny has changed that understanding.
None of these assertions is persuasive.
While some members of the Thirty-ninth Congress, the body that drafted the
Fourteenth Amendment, thought that Section 5 would endow Congress with an
implementing power identical to its "necessary and proper" power, 122 the entire
Thirty-ninth Congress specifically rejected an enforcement power that would have
given Congress "power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to
118. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
120. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 382 (2001). (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (stating that the Court "hold[s] Congress to a strict, judicially created evidentiary
standard"); Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F3d 519, 530 (2000) ("It could not be clearer that con-
gruence and proportionality is a considerably more stringent standard of review than is rational
basis."); Laurence H. Tribe, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 959 (3d ed. 2000) (Sec-
tion 5 measures are subject to "something between intermediate and strict scrutiny," a standard
that embodies "a substantial, albeit not conclusive, presumption of unconstitutionality"); Robert
C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation
After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 477 (2000); Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate"
Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1158 (2001) (the congru-
ence and proportionality test involves "searching scrutiny"); Stephen Gardbaum, The Federal-
ism Implications of Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 682 (1998) (the Flores test is "more
rigorous" than minimal scrutiny); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A
Critique of City of Boeme v. Flores, Ill HARV. L. REV. 153, 166 (1997) (the Flores test embod-
ies a "narrow tailoring requirement typical of intermediate scrutiny").
121. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 120, at 1156-58; Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519,
534-35 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
122. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 120, at 1159 n.164.
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secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights
of life, liberty, and property." 12 3 This would have eliminated the state action re-
quirement and given Congress authority to do whatever it might think reasonable
to secure the specified rights. Perhaps it was rejected because it eliminated the
state action requirement, or because it gave Congress a substantive power to de-
cide the meaning of constitutional liberties, or because it gave Congress broader
authority to implement the Fourteenth Amendment than Congress thought wise.
We simply do not know. But Congress's rejection of the explicit "necessary and
proper" locution, a phrase with a settled constitutional meaning, makes it less likely
that Congress intended the enforcement power to be a clone of the implementing
power under the "necessary and proper" clause.
The linguistic similarities between the enforcement power and the implement-
ing power mask substantive differences between the two provisions, differences
that support significantly different levels of judicial review to purported exercises
of the granted powers. Broad authority by Congress to select means necessary and
proper to implement federal powers expands the power of Congress to displace
contrary exercises of state legislative power, but is constrained by the Court's power
to determine the outer limits of the delegated federal powers. The implementing
power does not enable Congress to specify constitutional norms to which states
must adhere. But if the enforcement power were coterminous with the implement-
ing power, states would be required to conform to congressionally determined con-
stitutional norms. Of course, Congress might disclaim any intent to redefine the
substance of the Constitution, but if its "remedial" power extended to any rational
means of enforcing those guarantees it would have virtually unlimited authority to
mold the Fourteenth Amendment as it wishes, all in the name of rational
remediation. 124
There are, however, some who say that the enforcement power contemplates
an active role for Congress in establishing the substance of the constitutional rights
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 125 They argue that Congress, as an insti-
123. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
124. The distinction drawn here is conceptual kin to the "autonomous state governance"
cases, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997). The principal vice of commanding a state legislature to act in a federally prescribed
fashion is that, with enough such commands, there is no practical ability for the state legislature
to act independently of the federal puppet-master. Similarly, one vice of conscripting state
executive officials to execute federal law is that, with enough federal execution duties, there is
no practical ability of the state official to execute state law. Congress may, of course, preempt
state law, and thus narrow the range of a state's legislative or executive independence, but pre-
emption will not affect the autonomy of a state's legislature or executive in the fields of life left
open to them.
An enforcement power that extends to anything that Congress might rationally think enforces
equal protection or due process forecloses any independent judgment on the subject by the Court,
and leaves Congress with virtually plenary power to define the ends of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and to select the means of getting there. By contrast, the broad implementing power
possessed by Congress is limited to the means chosen to achieve the judicially monitored ends
of power. Of course, if the Court abdicates any real responsibility to specify the boundaries of
those ends, there is little real difference, and that is probably the explanation for a revival of
judicial scrutiny of the commerce power, as exemplified by Lopez and Morrison.
125. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation,
2000 Sup. CT. REV. 61; Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999);
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tution, is better suited to identify state practices that, while literally valid in terms
of judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, raise the possibility of
hidden wrongful motive. Justice Brennan, for example, invoked the "institutional
competence" of Congress to justify his now repudiated holding that Congress could
engage in "benign" racial discrimination so long as such discrimination was sub-
stantially related to an important state objective. 126 Justice Brennan, however,
failed to detail the nature of this competence. Although Congress is capable of
collecting evidence that would be inadmissible in ordinary lawsuits, which may be
very useful to identify and craft solutions to public problems, that fact says noth-
ing about the relative ability of Congress and the Court to discern when those
solutions, however desirable, transcend the constitutional boundaries upon federal
power. No doubt Congress is more competent than the Court to diagnose and
prescribe for public ailments, but can there be any less doubt that the Court is more
competent than Congress to decide the content of constitutional norms? The Four-
teenth Amendment specifies the norms---equal protection and due process, for the
most part-and by our long-standing tradition of judicial review it is for the Court
to flesh out the content of those norms. The Fourteenth Amendment gives Con-
gress power to enforce those norms, not to invent them. The latter power would
permit Congress to amend the Constitution without resort to Article V.127
Finally, some argue that Flores and its progeny made no change in a pre-
existing understanding that Congress could use any "rational means" to enforce
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, an understanding that equates the
scope of the enforcement power with that of the implementing power. 128 The
Steven A. Engel, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boeme v. Flores
and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115 (1999); Douglas Laycock,
Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boeme v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (1998); Michael W.
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, Ill HARV. L.
REV. 153 (1997).
My rebuttal of Akhil Amar's "intratextual" argument that the scope of the Section 5 enforce-
ment power should be identical to the admittedly broader scope of the enforcement power under
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment may be found in Calvin Massey, Federalism and the
Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431,492-94 (2002). In brief, my rebuttal is that because the
Thirteenth Amendment applies to private citizens as well as governments, its substance is more
akin to Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers (which enables Congress to regulate the citi-
zenry), and thus the scope of the enforcement power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment should be the same as Congress's power to implement its Article I powers, but because the
Fourteenth Amendment prescribes constitutional limits on state power, the substance of which
is the "province and duty" of the courts to declare, Congress's Section 5 enforcement power
ought to be more carefully tethered to the rights it is empowered to "enforce," not create.
126. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,' 497 U.S. 547, 563 (1990), overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
127. Bruce Ackerman is probably the foremost exponent of the notion that the Constitution
may be freely amended by "extraordinary" moments of ordinary politics. See generally 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). The best judicial rejection of this idea, in
the context of the enforcement power, remains that made by the younger Justice Harlan in Or-
egon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 205 (1970):
Congress is subject to none of the institutional restraints imposed on judicial
decisionmaking; it is controlled only by the political process. In Article V, the Fram-
ers expressed the view that the political restraints on Congress alone were an insuffi-
cient control over the process of constitution making.... To allow a simple majority
of Congress to have final say on matters of constitutional interpretation is therefore
fundamentally out of keeping with the constitutional structure.
128. See, e.g., Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 530 (2000) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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argument begins with the proposition that Congress's "power to legislatively en-
force the... Fourteenth Amendment is concurrent with the Court's judicial power
to enforce the Amendment," 129 and for that reason "Congress is not required to
establish an evidentiary predicate... in order to enact legislation pursuant to [the
enforcement power] to protect individuals from the denial of the equal protection
of the laws based on race, gender, or other suspect classifications."1 30 The argu-
ment continues by asserting that the Court has never required Congress to make
specific findings of fact to invoke its enforcement power validly; rather, the Court
has said that such findings are "[o]ne means" by which it has determined the dif-
ference between valid and invalid exercises of the enforcement power. 13 1 The
argument ends by asserting that because Flores and its progeny all dealt with leg-
islation addressing conduct that was not presumptively prohibited by the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Flores line of cases left undisturbed the prior understand-
ing that Congress could use any rational means to address conduct presumptively
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 132
There are several problems with this argument. First, it is manifestly clear
that Flores overruled the alternative holding of Katzenbach v. Morgan1 33 recog-
nizing a concurrent power in Congress to define the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Second, although the Court has never explicitly stated that specific
findings by Congress of unconstitutional conduct by states is a predicate for a
valid invocation of the enforcement power, the Court has uniformly voided legis-
lation enacted without such predicate findings. To be sure, each of those cases,
with the exception of Flores and Morrison, involved the related question of whether
Congress had effectively abrogated state sovereign immunity, and it may be that
for purposes of abrogation of sovereign immunity Congress must make detailed
findings of fact, but perhaps not otherwise. 134 Finally, not all the cases in the
Flores line involved legislation banning conduct that was presumptively valid un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment. Morrison is the notable exception. The civil
remedy provision of the VAWA did not involve abrogation of sovereign immunity
and was Congress's response to what it thought was an unconstitutional denial to
victims of sex-based violence of an adequate remedy in the state courts for such
injuries. 135 Sex discrimination by states in the provision of civil remedies for
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000).
132. Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d at 537-40 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
133. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
134. In Garrett, for example, the Court did not question the legitimacy of the legislative
objective-prohibition of discrimination against the disabled. Instead, the Court assessed the
means chosen by Congress to reach that goal. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 368 U.S.
356, 368-74 (2001). To do so, the Court examined the evidence before Congress that states
were in fact engaging in such discrimination and refused to consider evidence that political
subdivisions of a state had discriminated against the disabled because those actors do not enjoy
sovereign immunity. Id. The implication of that selective look at the evidence before Congress
is that evidence of constitutional violations by any state actor is relevant to the scope of Congress's
enforcement power when Congress is invoking that power for some purpose other than abroga-
tion of state sovereign immunity. Garrett may suggest that a broader array of evidence will be
germane to assessing the legitimacy of exercise of the enforcement power in a context other than
abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Of course, Morrison does not confirm this reading, and
so the importance of specific findings of fact by Congress remains unresolved.
135. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605-07 (2000).
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personal injuries is surely presumptively unconstitutional, but the Court struck
down the provision anyway, reasoning that Congress had failed to demonstrate
that states had in fact been discriminating by sex in affording remedies for sex-
based violence. 136 Thus, the argument from precedent seems uncommonly weak,
particularly in the context of the use of the enforcement power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity.
III. IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE
What, then, are the implications of this New Federalism for federal power to
prohibit sex discrimination in employment? In part, the answer depends on whether
the regulated employment is public or private. In part, the answer depends on the
nature of the regulatory device.
Most employment in America is in the private sphere. The ability of Congress
to address the practices of private employers is mostly a function of the scope of
the commerce clause. Despite Lopez and Morrison it is surely the case that almost
all employment practices have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Be-
cause federal regulation of employment practices is, by anyone's definition, regu-
lation of commercial activity, it may be that Congress need not make any specific
findings that such regulated practices substantially affect interstate commerce. Even
if Congress must make such findings, it does not seem that it should be particularly
difficult for Congress to do so. Thus, there is no realistic concern that such mea-
sures as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 137 or the Equal Pay
Act (EPA), 138 or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 139 are likely to founder on the
rock of the commerce power.However, if Congress seeks to regulate sex discrimination by public employ-
ers more stringently than that practiced by private employers, then the possibility
exists that the state autonomy exception to the commerce power, exemplified by
New York v. United States140 and Printz v. United States,14 1 might limit congres-
sional power. This possibility is probably more imagined than real, however, be-
cause the Court has made it clear that the state autonomy exception applies only
when Congress uses its commerce power to regulate only the states, as distin-
guished from an exercise of the commerce power to regulate generally private and
public behavior. Moreover, the state autonomy exception probably applies only to
regulations of core attributes of state sovereignty, although that conclusion is equivo-
cal at best. In any case, it is hardly likely that Congress would choose to prohibit
some aspect of sex discrimination in employment only with respect to public em-
ployees, and even less likely that such a regulation would affect only public em-
ployees discharging the core functions of state government, but if Congress did so
act it might discover that it lacks authority to use its commerce power in such a
fashion.
A far more realistic issue is the possibility that Congress's ability to subject
states to private damages suits for violation of federal laws prohibiting sex dis-
136. Id. at 614-15.
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
140. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
141. 521 U.S. 898 (1998).
[Vol. 55:1
crimination in employment will be restricted. If the Court in deciding Hibbs re-
verses the Ninth Circuit, and concludes that in order to invoke its enforcement
power validly, Congress must document a history and pattern of unconstitutional
sex discrimination by states in granting family care leave, then Congress will face
a narrowed set of issues upon which it may bring its enforcement power to bear.
Although it hardly seems necessary to say so, "our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination," 142 one that manifested itself in the work-
place by "state laws [that] supported a regime in which men and women were
assigned, respectively, roles as workers and homemakers." 143 That regime has, of
course, broken down, both culturally and legally, and it was in response to the
changed culture of work that the FMLA was adopted. In recognition of the fact
that all workers, male and female, have family as well as workplace responsibili-
ties, and that most workplace rules continued to treat men as breadwinners and
women as homemakers, Congress adopted the sex-neutral policies of the FMLA in
order to accommodate the needs of all workers, men and women, to discharge
duties at home and at work, and to eliminate two types of sex discrimination: against
women (who supposedly need family leave because they are homemakers first and
workers second, and thus are less desirable employees); and against men (who
supposedly do not need family leave because they are solely workplace warriors
and thus will not be granted leave no matter how dire their family situation). If the
result of Hibbs is that Congress must make specific findings of unconstitutional
discrimination concerning each measure it enacts (e.g., family leave offered by
state employers) rather than more general findings of a history and pattern of un-
constitutional discrimination (e.g., a legal regime treating men as workers and
women as homemakers), Congress may well find it difficult to use the enforce-
ment power to create imaginative new remedies to address old and familiar prob-
lems.
If that should be the case, one must wonder whether the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy,
might be an invalid exercise of the enforcement power. The Court has, of course,
held that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not unconstitutional sex dis-
crimination, reasoning that because such discrimination divides pregnant people
(all of which are women) from nonpregnant people (all men and most women, at
least at any given time) it does not discriminate by sex. 144 One must wonder
whether the Pregnancy Discrimination Act might be outside the enforcement power,
assuming the lack of a convincing demonstration in the legislative record that states
have a history and pattern of using pregnancy discrimination as a device to engage
in sex discrimination. That might be hard to prove, given the Court's unconvinc-
ing idea that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination.
Moreover, some implications of the Court's notion that pregnancy discrimina-
tion is not sex discrimination call into question the validity of the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII insofar as they are purported exercises of the enforcement power.
Title VII extends beyond the reach of the Equal Protection Clause by, among other
things, prohibiting employment practices that are "fair in form, but discriminatory
in operation." 145 Sex-neutral employment practices that, in effect, impose a sig-
142. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
143. Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 861 (9th Cir. 2001).
144. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974).
145. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971).
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nificant adverse impact on one sex are prohibited unless the employer can prove a
legitimate business reason for the practice. One reading of Geduldig v. Aiello 146 is
that pregnancy discrimination was not constitutionally problematic because the
pregnancy discrimination at issue was not intentional discrimination on the basis
of sex, but merely adventitious. In short, while pregnancy discrimination has a
disparate impact on women, that fact alone is insufficient to support the claim of
invidious sex discrimination. On that reading, one has to wonder whether Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act, each of which plainly reach disparate impact discrimi-
nation, are similarly infirm as exercises of the enforcement power.
However, were the Court to find that outlawing discriminatory effect is be-
yond the scope of the enforcement power, it would call into question the continu-
ing vitality of South Carolina v. Katzenbach1 4 7 and City of Rome v. United States. 14 8
In South Carolina, the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by concluding
that Congress's enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment (phrased iden-
tically to that of the Fourteenth Amendment) extended to prohibition of practices
that were not themselves violations of the Fifteenth Amendment but which per-
petuated the effects of past unconstitutional discrimination. 14 9 In Rome, the Court
upheld an amendment to the Voting Rights Act that barred voting practices that
would have the effect of diluting the black vote. 150 Even though the Fifteenth
Amendment prohibits only intentional racial discrimination, the Court reasoned
that the discriminatory effects provision was within the enforcement power be-
cause "Congress could rationally have concluded that ... electoral changes by
jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in
voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination," and thus it was within the
enforcement power to prohibit voting practices that have only a discriminatory
impact. 15 1 It is hard to believe that the Court is prepared to jettison such prece-
dents, cornerstones of racial political equality.
The Equal Pay Act (EPA) bars covered employers (including states) from dis-
criminating "between employees on the basis of sex ... for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar working conditions." 152 The EPA was enacted to remedy
the "endemic problem" of intentional sex discrimination in pay by eliminating the"ancient but outmoded belief that a man, because of his role in society, should be
paid more than a woman even though his duties are the same."' 153 The EPA does
not require an employee to prove purposeful discrimination on the part of the em-
ployer, and thus the EPA prohibits some conduct that is not presumptively uncon-
stitutional. However, because the affirmative defenses available to employers un-
der the EPA to justify wage differentials permit just about any reason other than
146. 417 US. 484 (1974).
147. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
148. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
149. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326-27.
150. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. at 177-78.
151. Id. at 117 (footnote omitted).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000). Once aprimafacie case is established, an employer may
justify the wage differential by proving one of four affirmative defenses: (1) a seniority system,
(2) a merit system, (3) a payment system based on quantity or quality of production, or (4) any
other factor other than sex. Id.
153. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188,195 (1974) (quoting S. REP. No. 88-176,
at 1 (1963)).
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sex, the EPA, as applied to the states, operates to do little more than bar intentional
sex discrimination that lacks any substantial relationship to an important state ob-
jective. Thus, the EPA prohibits no more conduct than the Equal Protection Clause.
Conceivably, the Court could strike down the EPA as an invalid exercise of the
enforcement power because the EPA, as originally enacted in 1963, was targeted
at sex discrimination by private employers and when Congress extended coverage
of the EPA to the states in 1974 it failed to make adequate specific findings of fact
that states had a history and pattern of such sex discrimination. However, every
federal court of appeals that has considered the issue has found that the EPA is a
valid exercise of the enforcement power. 154
Should congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment continue
to be restricted, Congress might consider using its spending power to induce states
to consent to suit for damages for violation of provisions that may be outside the
scope of the enforcement power. Congress could attach, as a condition to receipt
of federal funds by states for any purpose, a requirement that the states consent to
federally specified employment practices in connection with any activities funded
entirely or in part by federal money. This approach is not without its own prob-
lems. First, the Court has buried the constructive waiver doctrine, under which
states were deemed by certain actions to have constructively waived their sover-
eign immunity; 155 now, a state must consent unequivocally to waiver of its sover-
eign immunity. Of course, Congress could overcome this problem by attaching, as
a condition to receipt of federal funds by states for any purpose, a clear and un-
equivocal statement that by accepting such funds the states will be deemed to have
waived sovereign immunity with respect to any claims made by state employees
for violation of specified employment practices. That may not solve the problem,
though. Because Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida156 holds that Congress may
not use its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity, 15 7 it is entirely
possible that Congress may not do indirectly, via its Article I spending power, what
it may not do directly, via its Article I commerce power. Some guidance on this
point may be obtained this coming Term in an otherwise unrelated case, Pierce
County v. Guillen.158 In Guillen, the Court must decide whether Congress may
use its spending power to attach, as a condition of receiving federal money to abate
highway hazards, a bar on discovery or introduction into evidence of data com-
piled to facilitate state participation in the highway hazard abatement program.
The Court may well conclude that the state autonomy limitation upon the com-
merce power, exemplified by New York and Printz, also applies to the spending
154. See, e.g., Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d 927, 933 (2000); Kovacevich v. Kent State
Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 819 (6th Cir. 2000); Hundertmark v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 205 F.3d 1272,
1277 (11th Cir. 2000); O'Sullivan v. Minnesota, 191 F.3d 965, 967 (8th Cir. 1999); Anderson v.
State Univ. of NY, 169 F.3d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1999); Ussery v. Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431, 435
(5th Cir. 1998); Usery v. Charleston County Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir. 1977);
Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 155 (3d Cir. 1976).
155. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expenses, 527 U.S. 666, 678
(1999). "[T]he constructive-waiver experiment of Parden [v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State
Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964)] was ill conceived" and "whatever may remain of... Parden
is expressly overruled." Id. at 680.
156. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
157. Id. at 72-73.
158. 122 S. Ct. 2325 (2002). The decision to which certiorari was granted is Guillen v. Pierce
County, 31 P.3d 628 (Wash. 2001).
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power. Just as Congress may not interfere with autonomous state governance pro-
cesses by commanding state legislatures or executives to act in a prescribed fash-
ion, it may be that Congress lacks power to impose through its spending power
federal norms that interfere with autonomous state governance. 159 If so, given the
energy with which the Court has expanded state sovereign immunity, it is quite
possible that the Court would conclude that it is impermissible for Congress to
condition receipt of federal money upon a waiver of a key aspect of state sover-
eignty.
A final irony may exist. To the extent that statutes such as the family medical
leave provision of the FMLA, or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, or the Equal
Pay Act, may be beyond the enforcement power because Congress failed to make
adequate specific findings of unconstitutional conduct by the states, it may not be
so easy for Congress now to correct that failing. Partly because of the existence of
those laws, and others like them that seek to reinforce the legal and cultural changes
that recognize the fundamental equal humanity of men and women, much sex dis-
crimination has been abated, though not, of course, eliminated. But because of
this cultural change, effected in part through laws that the Court might find to be
outside the scope of the enforcement power, it may be difficult for Congress to
assemble a convincing factual demonstration of a contemporary history and pat-
tern of sex discrimination in state employment. The irony, of course, is that with-
out such a current factual showing Congress may not be able to use its enforce-
ment power.
IV. SUM1kRY
This may seem like a gloomy prognosis, but it is well to cast it in perspective.
Pursuant to its commerce power, Congress continues to have robust authority to
regulate sex discrimination by private employers. The limitations upon congres-
sional power to regulate sex discrimination by public employers may not occur-
the Court may affirm the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Hibbs-and even if the scope of
the enforcement power is narrowed in Hibbs, the effect of such a decision would
be limited. While such a decision would make it impossible for state employees to
recover money damages for sex discrimination in employment to the extent the
states have not consented to suit, states would remain liable for injunctive relief
and susceptible to suits by the United States to enforce federal laws that may lie
outside the enforcement power.
Within the employment context, the glass remains more than half full, but
outside of the employment context the glass may become more than half empty. If
congressional ability to use the enforcement power to address presumptively un-
constitutional sex discrimination is restricted in like manner to congressional abil-
ity to address presumptively constitutional conduct, Congress will have lost much
freedom to address state behavior that it believes hampers a full vindication of the
equal protection ideal of sex equality. That may be the more lasting legacy of what
the Court may decide in Hibbs.
159. The autonomous governance problem is more complex in Guillen than in New York or
Printz. In the latter cases the federal norm that restricted the states' autonomy was imposed
involuntarily. In Guillen, the federal norm is voluntarily accepted by the state's executive (by
accepting federal highway safety funds) but not by the state's judiciary, which exclusively feels
the pinch of the norm. A question to be answered by Guillen is whether that is a constitutionally
significant difference.
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